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ECB Supervisory Board Member Frames Supervision & Resolution as a Single Continuum After a Decade

ECB Supervisory Board Member Frames Supervision & Resolution as a Single Continuum After a Decade

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In a September 22, 2026 speech, ECB Supervisory Board member Pedro Machado argued that supervision and resolution form one continuum.
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Key Takeaways
  • In a September 22, 2026 speech, ECB Supervisory Board member Pedro Machado argued that supervision and resolution form one continuum.
  • He tied this to lessons from Banco Popular and Sberbank Europe, the reformed CMDI framework, and remaining gaps in liquidity, harmonization, deposit insurance and non-financial failure.
  • The speech is not binding, but it signals supervisory and resolution priorities that should shape how banks approach recovery planning, MREL and resolvability.
Deep Dive

In a September 22, 2026 speech, ECB Supervisory Board member Pedro Machado argued that supervision and resolution form one continuum. He tied this to lessons from Banco Popular and Sberbank Europe, the reformed CMDI framework, and remaining gaps in liquidity, harmonization, deposit insurance and non-financial failure. The speech is not binding, but it signals supervisory and resolution priorities that should shape how banks approach recovery planning, MREL and resolvability.

The most concrete development is the reformed Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance (CMDI) framework, published in the Official Journal in April 2026. It strengthens early intervention and gives the ECB a stronger role, with powers anchored directly in the SRM Regulation rather than dependent on national transposition. It also clarifies the escalation path from supervisory measures toward resolution, including ECB-SRB cooperation and information-sharing. The speech notes that effectiveness now depends on implementation. Banks should review early intervention triggers, escalation governance and information flows to supervisors and resolution authorities. On the operational side, the ECB and SRB are speeding up joint processing of applications to reduce own funds instruments and, since July 2026, applications for early redemption of MREL instruments. Treasury and capital teams should factor these shorter turnaround times into capital and MREL management plans.

Legal and litigation considerations are also highlighted. Following the ABLV judgment, the ECB's failing-or-likely-to-fail (FOLTF) assessment is a preparatory act reviewable only within challenges to the resulting resolution decision, and the transition from going concern to gone concern is treated as a single procedure. Post-resolution, supervisory involvement continues: purchaser and qualifying holding assessments, bridge institution authorization, licence withdrawal for residual entities, and enhanced monitoring of the surviving bank. Legal and compliance teams should keep contingency playbooks current for these steps, including stakeholder and litigation exposure.

The speech names four remaining gaps, with no deadlines given:
- **Liquidity in resolution:** There is no mechanism yet. The agreed ESM common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund, once in force, will not fully cover extreme stress.
- **Harmonization of national insolvency regimes:** Differences complicate the no-creditor-worse-off counterfactual.
- **Common deposit insurance:** It is still missing, and the Commission's July 2026 competitiveness Communication links completing the banking union to a genuine Single Market in banking.
- **Non-financial failure causes:** Cyber or IT incidents, sanctions and war are not well matched to the current toolkit. Further work is expected from the EU legislator and the Financial Stability Board.

Firms should test liquidity and funding-in-resolution capabilities (including Monday-morning funding scenarios); confirm MREL compliance and capacity for early redemption applications; participate in joint simulations and dry runs; stress test operational resilience, cyber and sanctions scenarios against resolvability; and monitor FSB and EU legislative developments. Risk impact is moderate and mostly forward-looking. Institutions with weak resolvability data, thin MREL buffers or underdeveloped operational continuity arrangements face the greatest scrutiny.

Source: European Central Bank

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