Regulators Urge Financial Firms to Review Technology Risks Following Disruptions

Key Takeaways
- Microsoft 365 Disruption Prompts Regulatory Warning: CySEC issued Circular C811 on November 17, 2026, following a disruption affecting Microsoft 365 services, including Exchange Online, and called on regulated financial firms to review their operational resilience arrangements.
- DORA Responsibilities Remain With Regulated Entities: Financial firms within DORA's scope remain accountable for maintaining operational continuity, including when critical or important functions depend on third-party ICT providers.
- Concentration Risks Require Assessment: CySEC expects firms to examine reliance on individual technology providers, identify potential single points of failure and consider the consequences of multiple services becoming unavailable simultaneously.
- Business Continuity and Backup Arrangements Face Review: Firms should assess recovery plans, alternative communications, backup accessibility and shared infrastructure dependencies to determine whether essential operations can be maintained or restored during prolonged outages.
- Exit Strategies and Resilience Testing Remain Priorities: CySEC has emphasized reviewing and appropriately testing exit plans under Article 28(8) of DORA, addressing weaknesses identified through testing or incidents, and maintaining effective ICT risk management arrangements.
Deep Dive
The Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission (CySEC) has called on financial firms to review their reliance on outside technology providers following a recent Microsoft 365 service disruption, warning that the loss of widely used systems can interfere with essential operations and expose weaknesses in existing recovery arrangements.
In Circular C811, issued November 17, the regulator cited the disruption affecting Exchange Online and certain functions of other Microsoft services. Such interruptions, CySEC said, can prevent financial institutions from accessing information, communicating with clients and counterparties, and conducting essential business activities.
The circular is addressed to Cyprus investment firms, central securities depositories, trading venues, crypto-asset service providers, alternative investment fund managers and UCITS management companies. It reminds entities subject to the European Union's Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) that responsibility for operational continuity remains with them, even when the technology supporting their activities is supplied by an outside provider.
CySEC wants firms to examine whether their existing ICT risk management, business continuity and recovery arrangements can withstand prolonged service disruptions. The regulator has placed particular emphasis on concentration risks, including situations in which several essential business functions depend on the same technology provider or underlying infrastructure.
The review is expected to be proportionate to each firm's size, overall risk profile and the nature, scale and complexity of its operations.
Firms are being asked to identify which ICT services and critical or important functions depend on Microsoft or other third-party providers, assess the consequences of those services becoming unavailable and determine whether their existing arrangements adequately address the risks.
That examination should extend to the contractual relationships themselves. CySEC expects firms to assess whether agreements with technology providers offer adequate assurances concerning service availability, incident communications, business continuity and recovery capabilities.
The regulator also wants firms to consider whether their dependence on individual providers creates single points of failure. A disruption affecting one provider could have consequences across several services, particularly where those services share infrastructure or other dependencies. Any risks identified through these assessments should be adequately reflected in firms' ICT risk management frameworks.
Recovery Plans Under Scrutiny
CySEC has devoted considerable attention to the practical effectiveness of business continuity arrangements, particularly when cloud-based or externally provided technology services remain unavailable for extended periods.
Firms are expected to review their ICT business continuity policies and response and recovery plans, including whether contingency arrangements would allow critical or important functions to continue operating or be restored within established recovery objectives.
The regulator has specifically identified alternative communications and access to information as areas requiring attention. Financial institutions should assess whether employees would retain the means to communicate and obtain essential information if their primary systems became unavailable. Continuity plans should also account for the simultaneous loss of multiple ICT services, including those that rely on common infrastructure.
Backup and restoration arrangements are another focus of the circular. CySEC expects firms to maintain appropriate safeguards for data and ICT systems supporting critical or important functions and to establish whether those safeguards would remain accessible during an outage affecting the primary service provider.
That includes examining whether backup systems depend on the same provider or infrastructure as the systems they are intended to protect.
Where such dependencies present risks, firms should consider appropriate measures to address them. Backup and restoration procedures must also be regularly tested, with recovery time and recovery point objectives remaining appropriate and achievable.
CySEC has additionally reminded firms to ensure that relevant personnel understand the procedures to be followed during significant ICT disruptions. Responsibilities for escalating incidents and coordinating recovery efforts should be clearly defined.
Exit Strategies and Resilience Testing
The circular also calls for a review of documented exit strategies for ICT services supporting critical or important functions, as required under Article 28(8) of DORA. CySEC expects those strategies to account for circumstances in which a provider experiences prolonged service unavailability, a deterioration in service quality or an inability to continue delivering contracted services.
Firms should assess whether affected services could be transferred to alternative providers or brought in-house where appropriate, taking into account technical dependencies, data portability and the need to maintain business operations throughout the transition.
The regulator has emphasized that exit plans should be periodically reviewed and appropriately tested, with particular attention to whether they could be implemented during significant disruptions. Existing digital operational resilience testing programs are also expected to address the potential unavailability of ICT providers supporting critical or important functions.
CySEC has encouraged firms to consider, where appropriate, scenarios involving prolonged cloud service outages, loss of electronic communications and the unavailability of systems required for business continuity and recovery.
Weaknesses identified through testing or actual incidents should be addressed and incorporated into firms' ICT risk management and recovery arrangements.
The November 17 circular does not introduce new DORA requirements or identify regulatory violations arising from the Microsoft disruption. Rather, it reiterates existing obligations and sets out areas in which CySEC expects regulated entities to assess the effectiveness of their arrangements and make improvements where necessary.
The regulator said it will continue monitoring significant disruptions involving ICT third-party providers and their implications for financial-sector operational resilience. CySEC may also engage with regulated entities to evaluate their exposure to such incidents, examine the effectiveness of their business continuity arrangements and assess compliance with applicable DORA requirements.
For firms relying on external technology providers, the immediate expectation is to identify weaknesses in their existing arrangements and take appropriate measures to address them. The regulator's concern is whether those arrangements can sustain essential operations when a service provider becomes unavailable, particularly where the disruption affects several interconnected systems.
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